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Abstract	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	orient	the	conflict	of	postmodernism	and	democracy	to	the	conventions	
of	language	and	the	ways	in	which	individuals	are	lead	to	mistake	metaphor	for	truth.	As	the	content	of	
this	argument	is	centered	around	the	concept	of	truth,	the	metaphor	is	exposed	as	a	device	that	both	
helps	and	hinders	ordinary	means	of	coping	with	feedback	as	the	line	between	art	and	analysis	is	drawn	
thicker	over	time.	
	
	
	
Once	upon	a	time,	in	some	out	of	the	way	corner	of	that	universe	which	is	dispersed	into	numberless	
twinkling	solar	systems,	there	was	a	star	upon	which	clever	beasts	invented	knowing.	That	was	the	most	
arrogant	and	mendacious	minute	of	“world	history,”	but	nevertheless,	it	was	only	a	minute.	
–	Friedrich	Nietzsche		
	
Nothing,	perhaps,	ever	got	nowhere	with	so	much	fascinating	ado.	
–	Alan	Watts	
	
	
	
Introduction:	To	Starve	a	Cold,	Feed	a	Fever		
The	human	intellect	is	driven	towards	truth	insofar	as	there	is	an	untruth	to	be	proven	
otherwise.	The	21st	Century	human,	with	all	the	communication	and	knowledge	known	to	the	universe,	
is	thought	to	be	closer	to	truth	than	any	predecessor.	What	could	have	changed	between	generations	to	
make	us	consider	this	one	to	be	extraordinary	by	comparison?	We	hardly	consider	the	inquiry	without	a	
smirk,	for	what	a	strangely	frivolous	question.	Not	long	after,	however,	we	grow	dumb	by	intuition	as	
few	elements	of	the	present	are	known	to	be	grounded	by	truth.	In	debt	to	our	loss	of	words	we	snatch	
the	first	thought	that	comes	to	mind	and	flaunt	our	diction	as	if	we	knew	the	answer	all	along.	And	so	it	
seems	that	the	intellect	is	so	unamused	by	the	exploration	of	truth,	and	truth	itself,	that	the	only	way	to	
answer	this	question	without	pandering	is	to	point	towards	what	amazing	products	of	truth	we	now	
have;	our	technology,	the	vehicle	of	truth	measured	by	profit.	If	such	is	the	case,	then	the	answer	to	our	
question—what	makes	us	think	we	are	so	special?—is	not	that	we	are	any	closer	to	truth,	but	that	we	
have	much	more	reason	to	withhold	it	from	ourselves	and	others;	and	in	this	way	we	are	special	
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because	no	public	has	ever	been	so	steered	towards	confession,	as	the	evidence	of	this	assumption	
follows.	
(1)	Given	that	the	public	is	comprised	of	individuals,	and	the	individual	intellect	is	driven	
towards	truth,	the	public,	by	magnitude,	will	absolutely	objectify	the	truth	in	technology	and	come	
across	tremendous	profit.	As	long	as	the	profit	is	evident,	there	may	be	no	apparent	untruth	to	prove	
otherwise.	(2)	Given	that	technologies	are	mere	objects	and	not	the	truth	itself,	however,	the	
dissatisfied	individual,	driven	by	untruth,	will	come	to	reject	the	sincerity	of	public	motives.	In	rejecting	
the	public	motive,	the	individual	must	develop	their	own	motive,	their	own	truth	in	lieu.	(3)	Yet,	in	order	
to	communicate	with	others,	which	is	imperative,	the	individual	is	obligated	to	use	the	conventional	
technologies	and	maintain	their	untruth,	resulting	in	a	contradicted	population	that	more	or	less	
unknowingly	dissimulates	into	a	cultural	apprehension	known	as	the	postmodern	condition.	This	
apprehension	might	have	been	left	unnamed	(therefore,	unnoticed)	if	it	were	not	for	the	democratic	
practice	that	seems	to	side	with	truth	over	untruth	by	popular	vote,	and	bounds	our	apprehension	to	
the	polar	surface	of	civic	life	in	doing	so.	(4)	Thus,	in	order	for	the	intellect	to	overcome	the	anxiety	of	
the	postmodern	condition,	and	rest	in	truth	after	all	as	is	the	will	of	the	individual	and	public	alike,	we	
must	acknowledge	the	opposition	without	influence	from	language,	democracy,	or	any	other	
technology.		
To	begin,	we	may	see	that	our	gadgets	are	clearly	just	so,	and	so	we	may	try	to	separate	the	
truth	from	technology	only	to	realize	that	the	two	are	quite	inseparable.	Then	we	may	suppose	that	if	
the	two	may	not	be	separated,	then	our	reason	to	criticize	truth	must	come	from	the	technology	itself.	
At	which	point	we	comfortably	resort	to	causality,	according	to	Alan	Watts,	with	a	“curious	need	to	put	
down	human	culture	and	intelligence	by	calling	it	a	fluky	by-product	of	blind	and	irrational	forces”	(12).	
In	this	way	or	another,	we	may	victimize	ourselves	and	blame	our	technologies	for	apparently	making	
our	lives	so	annoyingly	superficial,	and	we	forget	that	this	problem	is	an	antique	in	doing	so.	For	even	
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the	hind-sighted	are	exploited	by	the	present	in	believing	that	every	case,	action,	or	thought	may	only	
be	the	effect	of	something	else	by	assuming	that	“there	must	be	causes	for	all	of	them	going	back	into	
an	indefinite	past.	If	so,	I	can’t	help	what	I	do”	(Watts,	30).	Respectively,	we	charge	technology	for	
causing	untruth	and	determine	that	truth	is	better	off	elsewhere,	though	“elsewhere”	is	likely	just	
another	source	of	technology	that	would	be	sure	to	“cause”	this	apprehension	in	new	and	unexpected	
ways.		
Moreover,	one	will	wonder	why	the	truth	may	not	be	removed	from	technology,	for	there	must	
be	a	more	authentic	agent,	but	to	seriously	consider	the	scheme	is	to	extend	the	definition	of	
technology	to	language;	the	original	vehicle	of	truth,	but	not	the	truth	itself.	The	trouble	with	language	
as	a	tool	for	extending	truth	is	the	same	with	all	technologies;	that	things	are	categorized	and	made	
useful	through	a	binary	system;	as	everything	is	to	be	or	not	to	be.	For	example,	when	we	speak	of	
something	we	are	ultimately	not	speaking	of	anything	else,	but	in	order	to	communicate	we	must	
assume	that	this	something	represents	the	total	of	things,	if	only	for	a	moment	(Burke,	8–9).	Confined	
by	language	in	this	way,	however,	the	moment	may	last	a	lifetime	if	we	come	to	value	the	something	as	
if	it	were	the	everything	and	mistake	this	for	the	truth;	thus	reducing	the	relevant	conflict	to	untruth.	
For	this	reason	we	may	candidly	claim	our	opinion	and	call	it	truth,	which	satisfies	the	crusade,	as	
Friedrich	Nietzsche	would	claim,	insofar	as	we	remain	“indifferent	toward	pure	knowledge	which	has	no	
consequences”	(3).	But	such	a	truth	is	essentially	defined	in	opposition	to	things	untruthful,	and	so	the	
intellect	has	merely	chosen	a	position	to	defend	as	the	most	rational	and,	therefore,	superior	point	of	
view.		
In	considering	those	opposed,	however,	one	may	wonder	about	the	incoherence	of	truth––	
insofar	as	it	must	be	defined	differently	from	one	individual	to	the	next––and	may	so	become	seriously	
threatened	by	the	thought	that	their	truth	and	perceptual	foundation	cannot	be	the	truth;	reality.	In	
taking	time	to	choose	a	side	for	the	sake	of	truth,	as	truth	is	the	drive	of	the	intellect	and	opposition	the	
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function	of	language,	the	issue,	then,	is	that	we	find	ourselves	“boxed	in	some	special	in-group	which	
defines	itself,	often	with	the	most	elegant	subtlety,	by	the	exclusion	of	an	out-group”	(Watts,	119).	From	
this	point	forward,	the	public	is	necessarily	divided	between	those	in	and	those	out,	where	each	party	
must	be	fully	convinced	of	their	own	position	in	order	to	live	with	“truth,”	as	such	is	the	trouble	with	
democracy.	Now	fundamentally	opposed,	we	may	reject	our	intuition,	our	sense	of	untruth	and	
apprehension,	by	narrowing	our	mindness	until	the	trouble	objectively	appears,	as	such	is	the	position	
of	our	dueling	candidates.	For	this	reason,	language,	democracy,	and	mere	technology	alike,	Watts	
suggests,	“can,	instead	of	liberating	us	into	the	air	like	birds,	fix	us	to	the	ground	like	toadstools”	(44).		
Hitherto	one	will	hopefully	wonder,	“is	there,	then,	some	kind	of	a	lowdown	on	this	astounding	
scheme	of	things;”	could	there	be	a	trick	about	truth	(Watts,	7)?	Perhaps,	rather	than	assuming	truth	to	
be	some	sort	of	key	that	solves	the	puzzle,	the	truth	may	be	understood	within	the	search	itself.	As	
simple	as	this	solution	may	be,	the	trouble	is,	however,	that	the	“matter”	of	truth	remains	unaddressed	
(therefore,	unattended)	by	the	intellect,	as	it	is	“so	obvious	and	basic	that	one	can	hardly	find	the	words	
for	it”	(Watts,	12).	For	the	tacit	form	of	truth	excludes	its	content,	and	no	one	will	ever	come	close	
without	mentioning	the	unmentionable;	without	acknowledging	the	nothing	as	much	as	the	something.	
As	such,	the	truth	is	taboo,	where	“the	difficulty	in	realizing	this	to	be	so	is	that	conceptual	thinking	
cannot	grasp	it,”	because	we	do	not	have	words	that	fit	(Watts,	13).	Consequently,	in	order	to	evaluate	
truth,	we	must	begin	with	critical	thought	in	our	loss	of	words	and	conceptualize	that	“what	lies	beyond	
opposites	must	be	discussed,	if	at	all,	in	terms	of	opposites,”	as	such	is	the	function	of	metaphor	(Watts,	
151).		
Hence,	the	purpose	of	this	argument	is	to	explain	how	the	structure	of	language	implies	that	it	is	
perfectly	fine	for	the	truth	of	one	individual	to	contradict	the	truth	of	another,	which	gives	us	the	gift	of	
conscious	attention,	intelligence,	and	expertise,	but	altogether	negates	the	foundation	of	language	
where	all	elements	are	inherently	connected,	and	thus	the	tolerance	that	constitutes	democracy.	The	
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ignorance	of	which	is	the	limit	of	truth,	the	aggravator	of	disunity,	and	the	foundation	of	our	cultural	
doubt	known	as	the	postmodern	condition.	To	reach	this	thesis,	I	review	theoretical	scholarship	guided	
by	the	following	question:	As	we	assume	the	truth	in	language	by	the	disguise	of	metaphor,	could	the	
postmodern	condition	be	more	so	a	symptom	of	language	than	a	matter	of	truth?	Moreover,	how	does	
democracy	affect	our	diagnosis?		
To	articulate	a	response,	I	primarily	draw	from	the	theories	of	Friedrich	Nietzsche	and	Alan	
Watts,	as	a	couple	of	revolutionary	philosophers	who	criticize	the	use	of	language	in	speech	and	culture.	
I	utilize	Nietzsche’s	essay	On	Truth	and	Lies	in	a	Nonmoral	Sense	(1873)	to	explain	how	the	formation	of	
metaphor	is	forced	by	our	truth	drive,	but	we	often	misunderstand	the	metaphor	and	conceptually	
replace	the	essence	of	a	term	with	the	term	itself	and	the	object	that	comes	to	mind.	From	Watts,	I	
apply	the	lessons	within	The	Book:	On	The	Taboo	Against	Knowing	Who	You	Are	(1966)	to	explain	how	
people	of	Western	culture	are	compelled	by	oppositional	language	to	separate	their	experience	from	
the	whole,	which	produces	the	taboo	of	truth	and	thus	the	postmodern	condition.	In	the	following	
sections,	I	begin	my	analysis	by	exploring	the	concepts	of	postmodernism	and	metaphor	as	they	relate	
to	this	thesis	through	these	and	other	theorists.1	
Postmodernism:	Uncommon	Sense	
Postmodernism	is	a	contemporary	period	of	social	history	prompted	by	critical	analysis,	though	
characterized	by	a	problematic	relationship	between	the	intellect	and	the	notion	of	“art”	(or	critical	
thinking)	as	it	contradicts	the	evidence	of	truth.	With	this	shift	in	focus	to	the	technical	sciences,	Michael	
Calvin	McGee	found	that	critics	of	truth	were	introduced	to	“a	new	way	of	asking	questions	that	
centered	on	understanding	the	methods	rather	than	the	substance	of	their	academic	practice”	(274).	In	
normalizing	the	method	of	discovering	truth,	the	truth	became	an	element	to	measure	by	objectives	
                                                
1	As	a	caveat,	the	content	of	this	paper	is	theoretical	and	meant	to	be	plausible,	not	definitive.	As	the	
primary	objective	is	to	export	both	the	trivial	and	nontrivial	influences	of	language	on	culture,	I	highlight	
only	the	parts	of	postmodernism	and	democracy	that	pertain	to	this	thesis.		
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rather	than	an	experience	to	imagine	through	platforms	like	myth,	religion	and	metaphor.	Determined	
in	this	way	to	define	truth	and	thus	to	hold	the	truth,	postmodernism	may	better	be	expressed	as	“the	
age	of	analysis	and	specialization	when	we	lost	our	vision	of	the	universe	in	the	overwhelming	
complexity	of	its	details;”	for	the	necessary	particularities	of	science	have	since	replaced	the	
troublesome	peculiarities	of	creation	(Watts,	147).	This	favoritism	induced	a	naturalization	of	the	
mechanical	practice,	the	articulation	of	technology,	and	a	normal	worldview	of	its	product	as	truth.		
Given	this	pressure	to	translate	truth	into	reason,	the	truth	remains	repressed	by	experts	who	
would	rather	compare	notes	with	others	in	order	to	refine	their	own	ideas,	than	combine	speculation	
and	risk	being	caught	in	a	paradox.	Hence,	the	environment	as	expressed	by	the	academy	(and	those	
who	ought	to	know	better),	is	translated	to	the	public	as	a	sum	of	fragments	rather	than	anything	that	
resembles	a	coherent	truth	(McGee).	In	order	to	discover	by	analysis,	however,	Watts	contends	that	the	
trouble	lies	in	that	the	whole	must	be	ignored,	as	“perception	thus	narrowed	has	the	advantage	of	being	
hard	and	bright,	but	it	has	to	focus	one	area	of	the	world	after	another,	and	one	feature	after	another”	
(31).	Hence,	without	this	conscious	attention	nothing	would	have	ever	been	figured	to	matter,	but	in	
this	same	manner	we	separate	the	element	of	analysis	from	its	ecosystem	of	the	universe.	Likewise,	the	
more	we	figure,	the	we	more	know	about	the	elements	of	the	universe,	the	more	clear	our	picture	
develops	of	the	total	universe.	But	this	picture	is	just	a	picture––definitely	not	an	understanding	of	how	
the	elements	universally	interact	with	each	other––and	in	this	common	misunderstanding	we	
appropriate	an	idea	of	common	experience	that	resembles	something	like	“common	sense.”	The	result,	
however,	is	more	so	an	individualistic	and	overgeneralized	understanding	of	shared	life,	also	known	as	
conventional	wisdom	or	culture.	
Culture,	unlike	common	sense,	is	not	all	that	common	by	sense;	for	with	culture	we	“exist	in	a	
matrix	of	rules,	rituals,	and	conventions	that	we	‘take	for	granted’	by	assuming	their	goodness	and	truth	
and	accepting	the	conditions	they	create	as	the	‘natural	order	of	things’,”	and	so	we	do	not	naturally	
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relate	these	conventions	to	commonality	between	citizens	(McGee,	280).	The	obstacle,	here,	with	the	
definition	of	culture	is	that	citizens	may	be	offered	few	spaces	in	which	they	are	invited	to	consider	the	
role	of	our	total	environment.	Given	that	the	truth	is	apparently	present	(though	silenced	by	the	
“natural	order	of	things”)	with	technology,	we	categorize	our	experience	into	“natural	order”	by	habit	
and	without	seriously	considering	the	relationship	between	ourselves	and	everything	else.	As	such,	we	
act	as	if	everyone	were	operating	under	similar	conditions,	or	as	if	one	perspective	fits	all,	and	in	so	
doing	we	take	our	culture	out	of	context.	The	concern	remains	as	McGee	declares	that	“discourse,”	like	
culture,	“ceases	to	be	what	it	is	whenever	parts	of	it	are	taken	‘out	of	context.’	Failing	to	account	for	
‘context,’	or	reducing	‘context’	to	one	or	two	of	its	parts,	means	quite	simply	that	one	is	no	longer	
dealing	with	discourse	as	it	appears	in	the	world”	(283).		
Before	the	postmodern	period,	by	contrast,	the	matter	of	truth	was	relatively	straightforward.	
For	example,	McGee	best	summarizes	the	social	physics	of	the	preceding	era:		
Except	for	everyday	language,	discourse	within	a	particular	language	community	was	produced	
from	the	same	resources.	Further,	all	discourse	found	its	influence	on	the	same	small	class	of	
people	who	comprised	the	political	nation.	And	it	was	the	same	small	class	that	received	the	
benefits	of	a	homogenized	education.	There	was	little	cultural	diversity,	no	question	that	there	
was	in	every	state	a	well-defined	dominant	race,	dominant	class,	dominant	gender,	dominant	
history	and	dominant	ethnicity.	The	silent,	taken-for-granted	creed	of	the	all	true-blue	
Americans	(Frenchmen,	Englishmen,	etc.)	could	have	been	articulated	by	any	one	of	them	who	
had	been	conditioned	by	the	education	system	and	admitted	as	a	member	in	good	standing	of	
the	political	nation,	even	those	who	fancied	themselves	revolutionaries	(284).	
With	the	producers	of	discourse,	the	experts,	united	in	understanding,	their	means	of	influence	
developed	homogenous	societal	expectations	for	the	public.	Presently,	however,	as	knowledge,	
communication	and	influence	is	no	longer	reserved	for	those	alike,	the	matter	of	culture	is	increasingly	
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complex	and	those	conventions	that	we	“take	for	granted”	as	the	“natural	order	of	things”	are	stretched	
and	stressed	without	explanation	(McGee,	283).	Now,	with	so	much	diversity	in	thought	and	
representation,	“the	only	way	to	‘say	it	all’	in	our	fractured	culture	is	to	provide	readers/audiences	with	
dense,	truncated	fragments	which	cue	them	to	produce	a	finished	discourse	in	their	minds”	(McGee,	
288).	Hence,	culture	appears,	it	does	not	define.	Those	who	wish	to	understand	what	culture	does,	must	
do	so	by	their	own	articulation	and	thus	without	certainty.	Under	the	circumstances,	matters	are	
contemplated	without	bearing,	taken	out	of	context,	converted	to	untruth,	and	proliferated	as	truth	in	
oversight.	This	dynamic,	if	not	by	malice,	is	maintained	by	the	sheer	number	of	things	in	the	realm	of	
consideration,	the	presumed	irrelevance	of	one	subject	to	the	next	due	to	fragmentation,	and	the	pace	
of	evolution	in	knowledge,	given	“that	much	of	what	one	learns	is	school	is	already	obsolete	by	
graduation	day”		(Watts,	5).		
Amidst	the	blatant	unclarity,	the	suspicious	individual	will	come	to	distrust	the	public,	and,	
threatened	by	the	untruth,	they	will	find	solace	in	the	artifice	of	analysis	that	produces	such	matters	of	
truth.	Protected	and	directed	with	technology,	Nietzsche	explains	how	an	inattentive	person	may	
conclude	that,	“everything	is	secure,	complete,	infinite,	regular,	and	without	any	gaps.	Science	will	be	
able	to	dig	successfully	in	this	shaft	forever,”	without	recognizing	this	thinking	to	be	a	matter	of	isolation	
rather	than	consolation	(8).	Furthermore,	Watts	explains	that	because	the	pace	of	discovery	destabilizes	
the	balance	of	truth,	we	cope	with	untruth	by	playing	“frantic	games	of	one-upmanship,”	where	those	
opposed	cannot	realize	that	success	for	all	beings	is	a	measure	of	relativity	rather	than	force	(6).	Later,	
he	writes	that	morality	among	compatriots	consequently	falters	to	a	“monstrous	combination	of	
uncompromising	idealism	and	unscrupulous	gangsterism,	and	thus	devoid	of	the	humor	and	
humaneness	which	enables	confessed	rascals	to	sit	down	together	and	work	out	reasonable	deals”	
(132).	This	emphatic	ideology	in	the	individual	is	brewed	by	the	skepticism	of	public	motives	and	festers	
into	the	divisive	“postmodern	condition”	when	left	unchecked.		
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The	postmodern	condition,	though	felt	and	expressed	by	all	kinds	of	people	in	different	ways,	
belongs	to	the	silent	part	of	culture––the	“natural	order	of	things”––	and	so	those	unnatuned,	but	
affected	nonetheless,	naturally	discount	themselves	from	being	held	responsible	for	the	trouble	
(McGee,	283).	In	so	doing,	our	ordinary	ways	of	thinking	and	feeling	become	even	more	literal,	and	
evermore	divisive	with	“deception,	flattering,	lying,	deluding,	talking	behind	the	back,	putting	up	a	false	
front,	living	in	borrowed	splendor,	wearing	a	mask,	hiding	behind	convention,	playing	a	role	for	others	
and	for	oneself;”	all	this	to	conceal	the	intuition,	or	anxiety,	that	the	natural	order	is	not	grounded	by	
truth,	whether	or	not	we	think	of	it	in	this	way	(Nietzsche,	2).	At	which	point	the	contradiction	becomes	
clear:	If	citizens	must	develop	their	own	civic	attitudes	due	to	the	fragmentation	of	culture,	and	if	
people	cope	with	postmodernism	by	rejecting	the	public	ideology,	then	the	distrust	that	characterizes	
postmodernism	must	be	that	of	the	individual	who	outwardly	acts	as	if	“one	perspective	fits	all”	in	order	
to	protect	themselves,	but	does	nothing	to	live	this	truth.	And	in	this	way,	the	“apprehension	lying	
tacitly	in	the	back	of	our	minds”	becomes	so	much	the	matter	that	we	cannot	experience	authentic	
unity	between	citizens	(Watts,	12).		
Thus,	on	the	surface	postmodernism	is	a	name	for	the	current	relationship	between	the	
individual,	the	public,	and	their	environment	as	it	relates	to	truth,	though	nothing	about	the	way	we	talk	
about	this	relationship	will	seems	relevantly	truthful.	Now,	insofar	as	we	follow	these	ordinary	ways	of	
thinking	and	feeling,	Nietzsche	confirms	that	we	will,	“under	natural	circumstances	employ	the	intellect	
mainly	for	dissimulation,”	but	given	that	we	are	social	animals	who	must	exist	among	others,	the	
individual	eventually	“needs	to	make	peace	and	strives	accordingly”	from	their	best	interest	(2).	As	
common	language	is	the	primary	link	between	culture	and	communication,	we	make	peace	with	“a	
uniformly	valid	and	binding	designation”	for	things	through	metaphor;	“and	this	legislation	of	language	
likewise	establishes	the	first	laws	of	truth”	(Nietzsche,	2).	Considering	the	significance	of	the	
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postmodern	condition	as	an	enormous	collection	of	individuals	that	are	evidently	allergic	to	“binding	
designation,”	however,	we	would	be	mistaken	to	think	the	solution	could	be	so	simple	(Nietzsche,	2).		
The	Metaphor:	“Common	Sense”	
The	metaphor	as	a	device	of	language	is	far	more	prevalent	in	our	lives	than	the	average	person	
is	ready	to	accept,	for	the	ordinary	definition	is	a	practically	arbitrary	figure	of	speech	that	makes	our	
conversation	and	prose	more	elegant,	and	more	thoughtful.	George	Lakoff	and	Mark	Johnson	explain	
that	the	essential	grievance	to	this	assumption	is	that	such	“figures	of	speech”	are	in	fact	central	to	
communication,	as	the	“essence	of	metaphor	is	understanding	and	experiencing	one	kind	of	thing	in	
terms	of	another”	(5).	Given	that	linguistic	communication	governs	our	perception—for	what	can	be	
known	without	common	language—we	consequently	notice	that	“metaphor	is	pervasive	in	everyday	
life,	not	just	in	language,	but	in	thought	and	action”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	3).	And	through	the	use	of	
metaphor,	we	come	to	conceptualize	an	idea,	a	concept,	based	off	a	thing,	an	element,	experience,	or	
matter	of	contemplation	that	brings	its	essence	into	perceptual	existence.	The	matter	of	contemplation	
certainly	exists	in	the	physical	world	as	we	see	it,	but	it	would	not	be	until	its	essence	is	labeled	and	
described,	by	relating	it	to	other	labels	that	have	similar-but-different	properties,	that	we	become	
conceptually	aware	of	its	object.	At	which	point	the	“thing”	becomes	a	metaphorical	concept	derived	
from	the	articulation	of	its	likeness	to	another	thing.	And	so,	“our	ordinary	conceptual	system,	in	terms	
of	which	we	both	think	and	act,	is	fundamentally	metaphorical	in	nature,”	and	in	this	way	we	may	hardly	
notice	our	own	practice	of	metaphor	as	“the	way	we	think,	what	we	experience,	and	what	we	do	
everyday	is	very	much	a	matter	of	metaphor”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	3).		
For	example,	let	us	further	examine	the	creation	of	a	concept	by	considering	the	color	blue.	In	
theory,	as	someone	once	saw	the	color	and	envisioned	it	in	their	mind,	they	made	a	sound	that	
apparently	represented	the	vision	and	the	sound	formed	the	word	“blue.”	Each	time	the	person	saw	the	
color	again,	both	there	and	in	new	circumstances,	they	would	repeat	the	word	“blue”	to	themselves	or	
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others,	and	over	time	“blue”	became	the	requisite	description	for	any	combination	of	light	that	
produces	the	sight	of	its	color;	a	concept.	“Blue,”	however,	is	a	mere	representation	of	the	color,	and	
not	the	color	itself,	for	“the	‘thing	in	itself’	(which	is	precisely	what	the	pure	truth,	apart	from	any	of	its	
consequences,	would	be)	is	likewise	something	quite	incomprehensible	to	the	creator	of	language	and	
something	not	in	the	least	worth	striving	for”	(Nietzsche,	3).	The	practice	of	language,	therefore,	is	not	
to	know	or	discuss	things	as	they	are	by	themselves,	but	to	compare	concepts	like	“blue”	in	contrast	to	
other	concepts	like	“green.”	As	the	conceptual	indicator	is	metaphorical,	Nietzsche	claims	that	we	
“possess	nothing	but	metaphors	for	things—metaphors	which	in	no	way	correspond	to	the	original	
entities”	(4).	Metaphors,	Watts	suggests,	are	then	“simply	ways	of	‘figuring’	the	world	which	we	agree	to	
follow	so	that	we	can	act	in	cooperation,	as	we	agree	about	inches	and	hours,	numbers	and	words,	
mathematical	systems	and	languages”	(88).	Hence,	the	foundation	of	language	is	fundamentally	
untruthful,	but	we	classify	our	perception	with	metaphor	in	a	common	and	cultural	way,	thus	the	
intellect	“likewise	establishes	the	first	laws	of	truth”	(Nietzsche,	2).	
Further,	let	us	consider	how	the	word	“blue”	is	proliferated	to	point	where	it	becomes	a	
concept.	As	“blue”	appears	in	countless	circumstances,	we	know	that	one	case	of	“blue”	is	never	
completely	the	same	as	another	case	of	“blue;”	if	not	by	location,	then	by	value.	And	so	we	figure	that	
the	concept	“is	formed	by	arbitrarily	discarding	these	individual	differences	and	by	forgetting	the	
distinguishing	aspects”	(Nietzsche,	4).	Thus,	a	“word	becomes	a	concept	insofar	as	it	simultaneously	has	
to	fit	countless	more	or	less	similar	cases—which	means,	purely	and	simply,	cases	which	are	never	equal	
and	altogether	unequal”	(Nietzsche,	4).	We	grasp	the	concept	of	“blue,”	and	the	utility	of	the	word,	“by	
overlooking	what	is	individual	and	actual,”	and	in	this	way	we	may	use	the	word	to	describe	any	
occurence	of	its	likeness.	In	practice,	our	collection	of	concepts	forms	a	system	that	designates	the	
relationship	between	our	concepts	so	that	the	meaning	of	one	may	be	checked	by	the	meaning	of	
another,	just	as	the	color	wheel	categorizes	“blue”	with	the	other	colors	and	likewise	separates	“blue”	
Spencer		12	
 
from	happenings	of	“red,”	“yellow,”	“green”	and	so	on.	“Our	concepts,”	therefore,	“structure	what	we	
perceive,	how	we	get	around	in	the	world,	and	how	we	relate	to	other	people”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	3).	
This	is	the	duty	of	language,	the	order	of	society,	and	the	vehicle	of	truth,	as	“to	be	truthful	means	to	
employ	the	usual	metaphors”	(Nietzsche,	5).		
Then	what	exactly	is	truth,	if	not	language?	Nietzsche	best	explains	the	motion	of	metaphor	in	
culture	with	his	discussion	on	the	inherent	fiction	of	language,	where	he	identifies	the	truth	as:		
A	movable	host	of	metaphor,	metonymies,	and;	anthropomorphisms:	in	short,	a	sum	of	human	
relations	which	have	been	poetically	and	rhetorically	intensified,	transferred,	and	embellished,	
and	which,	after	long	usage,	seem	to	a	people	to	be	fixed,	canonical,	and	binding.	Truths	are	
illusions	which	we	have	forgotten	are	illusions—they	are	metaphors	that	have	become	worn	out	
and	have	been	drained	of	sensuous	force,	coins	which	have	lost	their	embossing	and	are	now	
considered	as	metal	and	no	longer	coins	(5).		
This	quote	clarifies	the	point	that	all	language	and	all	thought	is	untruthful,	though	not	untruthful	in	the	
way	that	we	think	of	as	“misinformation.”	Rather,	language	is	untruthful	because	the	words,	the	forms,	
the	objects,	do	not	contain	the	essence	of	the	“thing”	they	mean	to	represent.	For	example,	Watts	
satirizes	this	trap	by	assuming	that	“one	must	take	care	not	to	confuse	image	with	fact,	which	would	be	
like	climbing	up	the	signpost	instead	of	the	road”	(Watts,	13).	In	further	explanation,	Nietzsche	credits	
the	practice	of	metaphor	and	the	ways	in	which	our	language	could	inherit	the	truth:		
Thus,	to	express	[metaphor]	morally,	this	is	the	duty	to	lie	according	to	a	fixed	convention,	to	lie	
with	the	herd	and	in	a	manner	binding	upon	everyone.	Now	man	of	course	forgets	that	this	is	
the	way	things	stand	for	him.	Thus	he	lies	in	the	manner	indicated,	unconsciously	and	in	
accordance	with	habits	which	are	centuries’	old;	and	precisely	by	means	of	this	unconsciousness	
and	forgetfulness	he	arrives	at	his	sense	of	truth.	From	the	sense	that	one	is	obliged	to	
designate	one	thing	as	“red,”	another	as	“cold,”	and	a	third	as	“mute,”	there	arises	a	moral	
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impulse	in	regard	to	truth.	The	venerability,	reliability,	and	utility	of	truth	is	something	which	a	
person	demonstrates	for	himself	from	the	contrast	with	the	liar,	whom	no	one	trusts	and	
everyone	excludes.	As	a	“rational”	being,	he	now	places	his	behavior	under	the	control	of	
abstractions	(5).			
This	quote	from	Nietzsche	shows	us	how	everyone	ought	to	follow	suit	if	we	wish	to	satisfy	“that	
puzzling	truth	drive,”	given	that	language	is	inherently	untruthful	(2).	But,	as	metaphors	make	up	our	
conceptual	system,	and	as	our	“conceptual	system	is	not	something	we	are	normally	aware	of,”	Lakoff	
and	Johnson	explain	that	“we	simply	think	and	act	more	or	less	automatically	along	certain	lines”	(3).	
And	when	we	act	along	certain	lines,	Watts	argues	that	we	“resort	to	the	convention	of	using	dualistic	
language	as	the	lines	of	perspective	are	used	to	show	depth	on	a	flat	surface”	(151).	In	so	doing,	we	take	
communication	at	face-value	and	forget	that	“the	original	perceptual	metaphors	are	metaphors	and	[we	
take]	them	to	be	the	things	themselves”	(Nietzsche,	7).		
Hence,	the	use	of	metaphor	in	everyday	language	is	the	foundation	of	what	we	think	of	as	
common	sense.	In	using	metaphor	appropriately	despite	the	postmodern	condition,	we	may	satisfy	our	
seemingly	desperate	search	for	truth.	However,	if	the	postmodern	condition	includes	the	common	
rejection	of	public	ideology	on	the	basis	of	inauthentic	nature,	and	metaphor	is	a	necessarily	common	
public	ideology	that	is	inauthentic	by	nature,	then	it	appears	that	the	taboo	energizing	our	condition	is	a	
contradiction,	in	essence,	all	the	more	taboo.	In	short,	postmodernism	is	a	double-blind,	as	Watts	
explains,	“a	game	with	self-contradictory	rules,	a	game	doomed	to	perpetual	self-frustration”	(73).	The	
symptoms	of	the	matter	have	us	occupied	in	a	circular	quest	for	truth	on	the	public	scale,	as	the	truth	is	
defined	by	illusion	and	can	never	be	experienced	until	accepted	as	such.	With	the	foundation	of	this	
argument	now	settled,	the	principle	assumption	from	this	point	forward	is	that	much	of	our	cultural	
distaste	with	the	public	is	as	much	an	illusion	as	it	is	a	metaphor.	Furthermore,	by	identifying	the	
metaphor,	Lakoff	and	Johnson	claim	that	we	may	begin	to	break	down	the	conceptual	content	of	
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culture––the	postmodern	condition––through	language,	as	“the	concept	is	metaphorically	structured,	
the	activity	is	metaphorically	structured,	and,	consequently,	the	language	is	metaphorically	structured”	
(5).	With	metaphor	so	oriented	as	the	sly	trap	of	language,	we	may	now	reconsider	the	strain	of	
postmodernism	by	evaluating	some	patterns	found	in	everyday	life.		
The	Postmodern	Metaphor:	A	Double-Blind	
“Postmodernism,”	the	“postmodern	condition”,	“post	truth”	and	“amusing	ourselves	to	death”	
are	metaphors	that	carry	the	conceptual	relationship	between	the	modern	human,	the	public,	and	their	
environment	as	it	relates	to	truth	(McGee;	Harari;	Postman).	As	everything	has	to	do	with	this	
relationship,	the	social	being	of	the	intellect	must	address	it	throughout	every	conversation	and	
throughout	every	thought.	In	broadening	our	terms	to	“misinformation,”	“hierarchy,”	“egalitarianism,”	
“relativity,”	“collective,”	“truth,”	and	so	on,	we	may	come	to	realize	that	anything	we	think	of	is,	by	
extension,	a	concept	of	postmodernism.	Hence,	we	hardly	notice	the	use	of	ubiquitous	terms	that	
describe	the	relationship	less	clearly;	for	the	concept	itself	is	unclear.	And	we	are	misguided	not	only	in	
that	we	must	use	language	to	share	our	culture,	but	more	so	by	the	way	that	the	illusory	nature	of	a	
metaphor	contains	within	itself	the	silent,	“taken	for	granted”	parts	of	culture	(McGee,	283).	Take	the	
term	“misinformation,”	for	example,	as	we	generally	use	it	to	talk	about	how	news	representatives	relay	
inaccurate	information	for	whatever	reason,	but	we	do	not	normally	use	the	term	to	talk	about	why	the	
spread	of	inaccurate	information	is	so	prevalent	that	we	have	a	term	for	it,	as	the	use	of	the	term	
excludes	the	discussion.	Or	perhaps	we	ought	to	consider	the	term	“truth,”	for	we	generally	use	the	
term	as	a	noun	to	categorize	things	as	either	genuine	or	non-genuine,	but	we	do	not	normally	use	the	
term	as	a	verb	to	describe	how	the	act	of	categorizing	is	the	more	genuine	matter	of	truth,	and	why	
would	we?	If	all	that	“truth”	requires	is	a	measure	of	authenticity,	insofar	as	it	appears,	then	we	ought	
not	go	any	further	to	explain	why.	Hence,	the	function	of	the	metaphor	that	addresses	the	taboo,	the	
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concept	and	truth	itself,	is	lost	beneath	the	surface	of	its	form	without	suspicion,	as	“it	is	hard	indeed	to	
notice	anything	for	which	the	languages	available	to	us	have	no	description”	(Watts,	33).	
Indeed,	as	everyday	language	describes	our	postmodern	condition,	the	intellect	unbeknowingly	
converses	with	others	about	the	state	of	truth	and	thus	becomes	weaker	to	the	concept	of	untruth,	for	
it	is	much	more	difficult	to	hold	a	bearing	on	the	state	of	truth	without	direct	relation	to	its	context.	In	
this	way,	Nietzsche	proposes	that	the	individual	may	only	confront	the	postmodern	condition	by	taking	
it	literally,	for	“only	by	forgetting	this	primitive	world	of	metaphor	can	one	live	with	any	repose,	security,	
and	consistency,”	with	the	“invincible	faith	that	this	sun,	this	window,	this	table	is	a	truth	in	itself”	(7).	
Thus,	in	relating	ourselves	to	the	public	with	the	literal	interpretation	of	postmodernism,	our	culture	is	
normalized	“into	less	colorful,	cooler	concepts,”	so	that	the	intellect	may	“entrust	the	guidance	of	[their]	
life	and	conduct	to	them”	in	contrast	to	the	aspects	of	culture’s	silent,	therefore,	intrinsic	ambiguity	
(Nietzsche,	5).		
For	example,	the	messy,	nondescript	and	modest	interpretation	of	the	“postmodern	condition”	
would	be	so:	(1)	If	the	term	“condition”	is	to	describe	the	relationship	between	the	modern	human,	the	
public	and	the	environment	as	it	relates	to	truth,	then	the	status	of	this	relationship	must	have	changed.	
(2)	If	the	term	“postmodern”	is	to	describe	a	unique	era	that	previous	humans	did	not	experience,	then	
our	survival	techniques	should	be	different	than	they	were	before	so	as	to	accommodate	the	
“condition.”	(3)	With	critical	thinking	we	recognize	the	differences	not	only	between	ourselves	and	
ancestors,	but	also	between	ourselves	and	others,	and	we	find	the	foundation	of	our	condition	as	
differences	unappreciated	as	such.	(4)	Empathetically,	we	come	to	terms	with	the	“postmodern	
condition”	by	celebrating	our	differences	as	truth,	and	we	are	fulfilled	by	realizing	what	we	had	always	
secretly	wished	would	be	so.	(5)	In	practicing	truth,	we	find	meaning	in	connectivity	and	carry	on	with	
the	purpose	of	yours	as	with	mine;	and	in	the	safety	of	this	sureness,	the	“postmodern	condition”	
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becomes	a	landmark	of	human	history	where	individuals	may	prosper	in	sync	with	the	public	as	both	live	
in	the	love	that	was	there	all	along.	
Contrariwise,	the	less	colorful,	decisive	and	literal	interpretation	of	the	“postmodern	condition”	
follows:	(1)	If	the	term	“condition”	is	to	describe	the	relationship	between	the	intellect,	the	public	and	
the	environment	as	it	relates	to	truth,	then	the	status	of	this	relationship	must	be	critical	and	potentially	
dangerous.	(2)	If	the	term	“postmodern”	is	to	describe	a	unique	culture	that	ancestral	humans	did	not	
experience,	then	we	feel	obviously	unique	when	defending	ourselves	for	survival	from	this	threatening	
“condition.”	(3)	In	critical	analysis	we	subtract	ourselves	from	being	held	responsible	for	the	condition	
itself	and	turn	hostile	towards	others	in	assuming	they	must	be	to	blame.	(4)	In	so	justifying,	we	grapple	
with	the	“postmodern	condition”	by	alienating	ourselves	from	the	public	project,	and	we	feel	honest	in	
practicing	what	we	already	suspected	from	others.	(5)	Comforted	by	this	“truth,”	we	find	personal	
meaning	in	tribalism	and	carry	on	with	the	purpose	of	mine	over	yours;	and	with	our	guard	at	bay,	the	
“postmodern	condition”	secures	foothold	as	the	tyrant	of	taboo––where	no	family	may	totally	trust	
another––without	so	much	as	an	explanation.		
The	differences	between	these	two	interpretations	host	the	foundation	of	our	disgruntled,	
unproductive	search	for	truth	because	it	hides	in	plain	sight	when	our	“eyes	merely	glide	over	the	
surface	of	things	and	see	‘forms’,”	as	is	so	often	the	case	(Nietzsche,	2).	The	communication	of	truth,	
therefore,	as	Lakoff	and	Johnson	propose,	is	“not	poetic,	fanciful,	or	rhetorical;	it	is	literal,”	and	so	we	
cannot	help	but	understand,	discuss,	and	implement	our	ideas	to	the	letter	(5).	For	example,	if	the	
former	interpretation	is	considered	more	foolish	than	truthful—as	there	is	already	peace	among	people,	
but	to	talk	about	it	so	earnestly	implies	that	there	is	none—then	the	latter	(in	opposition)	is	considered	
more	vindicated	than	untruthful,	as	to	talk	of	peace	so	gravely	implies	that	there	is	none	and	so	we	rest	
assured	knowing	that	there	may	no	be	none.	According	to	how	we	act	as	if	truth	were	literal,	we	are	
drawn	to	the	latter	interpretation	because	it	follows	the	form	of	our	feelings:	we	feel	unsure	despite	the	
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appearance	of	sureness	in	modernity,	and	to	quell	this	unsureness	it	prescribes	an	objective	course	of	
action:	survival	by	conquest.	In	contrast,	the	former	is	no	more	felt	than	it	is	apparent,	as	it	requires	a	
practice	as	intangibly	vague	as	“compassion”	or	“unity.”	In	which	case,	even	if	an	individual	was	so	
thoughtful	as	to	claim	the	former,	they	could	not	stand	a	chance	against	those	imposed	to	conquer,	and	
by	default	they	heed	the	opposition.	Thus,	in	order	to	cut	to	the	chase,	Nietzsche	grieves	that	our	senses	
are	plainly	“content	to	receive	stimuli	and,	as	it	were,	to	engage	in	a	groping	game	on	the	backs	of	
things”	(2).		
On	the	other	hand,	it	is	no	accident	that	we	have	been	lead	to	conceptualize	the	truth	literally,	
for	the	synonyms	of	“literal”	may	be	“accurate,”	“actual,”	“authentic,”	“unvarnished,”	and	even	“true.”	
As	it	stands,	a	portion	of	the	conceptual	network	of	truth	characterizes	the	concept	of	truth	“and	the	
language	follows	suit”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	7).	In	this	way,	we	literally	understand	and	experience	truth	
as	something	to	materialize	as	a	“matter	of	fact,”	that	can	be	“written”	or	“proofed.”	Likewise,	we	
understand	and	experience	untruth	as	the	kind	of	thing	that	can	be	“metaphoric,”	“figurative”	or	plainly	
“false.”	With	this	linguistic	orientation,	the	individual	that	would	be	distracted	by	the	possibility	of	truth	
beyond	form	is	now	relieved	and	purposed	by	the	truth	as	it	literally	appears.	That	we	account	for	truth	
in	terms	of	objects	and	occurrences	allows	us	to	distinguish	parts	of	our	experience,	our	culture,	and	
“treat	them	as	discrete	entities	or	substances	of	a	uniform	kind,”	which	is	crucial	for	an	organization	like	
the	public	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	26).	Moreover,	Lakoff	and	Johnson	explain	that	by	taking	things	literally	
“we	can	identify	our	experiences	as	entities	or	substances,	we	can	refer	to	them,	categorize	them,	group	
them,	and	quantify	them—and,	by	this	means,	reason	about	them”	(26).	As	such,	Nietzsche	indicates	
that	the	“hardening	and	congealing	of	a	metaphor	guarantees	absolutely	nothing	concerning	its	
necessity	and	exclusive	justification,”	and	in	this	way	we	are	nowhere	lead	to	deeper	thinking	about	our	
circumstance,	nor	the	truth	itself	(8).	With	the	intellect	driven	towards	truth	and	thereby	vested	in	
objectivity,	it	becomes	absolutely	necessary	to	interpret	the	postmodern	condition	literally	if	only	
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because	everybody	else	is	doing	it.	Perhaps	this	is	punishment	for	judging	a	book	by	its	cover,	and	the	
very	reason	we	were	told	not	to	in	the	first	place.	
The	intellect,	thus	blinded	by	“truth,”	is	now	clearly	threatened	by	those	contrarian	and	will	
thrive	in	a	sense	of	a	priori,	for	great	minds	think	alike	and	the	rest	remain	in	opposition.	But,	as	“human	
purposes	typically	require	us	to	impose	artificial	boundaries	that	make	physical	phenomena	discrete,”	
the	public	opposition	would	likewise	not	exist	without	a	unifying	source	like	democracy	(Lakoff	and	
Johnson,	26).	As	such,	the	difficulty	with	postmodernism	may	be	that	while	each	citizen	is	presented	
with	a	choice	between	us	or	them,	as	Nietzsche	speaks	of	opposites	in	general,	“there	arises	a	moral	
impulse	in	regard	to	truth,”	where	one	side	must	be	more	honorable	than	the	other	(5).	Upon	examining	
how	the	structure	of	truth	is	organized	by	language,	and	given	that	the	intellect	is	driven	towards	truth,	
we	recognize	a	collection	of	hundreds	of	millions	of	individuals	that	relate	to	the	whole	with	this	
inclusive	and	ruthless	fight	across	opposing	sides,	“for	the	thrill	of	the	tale	is	to	find	out	how	the	good	
people	will	get	the	better	of	the	bad”	(Watts,	16).	As	distressed	and	disorganized	citizens	of	“freedom”	
and	“liberty”	as	the	“natural	order	of	things,”	what	direction	we	find	lies	the	rule	of	government,	with	
the	weight	of	truth	now	located	in	binary	code	(McGee,	283).		
Democracy:	In	Loco	Parentis		
In	considering	the	state	of	truth	through	the	lense	of	postmodernism,	we	find	that	language	
intrinsically	defines	both	the	content	of	experience	and	limitations	of	experience;	and	can	thereby	
produce	a	simulation	of	truth	in	contradiction	to	reality.	In	sequence,	democracy	is	a	system,	a	
technology,	a	tool,	and	a	metaphor,	that	extrinsically	defines	the	experience	of	postmodernism	by	
correlating	the	truth	with	power;	and	with	this	power	it	produces	a	simulation	of	object	truth.	For	
example,	in	the	previous	section	I	discussed	how	the	vocabulary	of	truth	forms	a	systematic	way	of	
talking	about,	understanding,	and	experiencing	truth,	and	so	if	the	postmodern	condition	is	described	as	
a	generational	apprehension	that	public	matters	are	unbalanced,	unfair,	and	unclear,	then	the	reality	
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may	be	that	things	are	very	much	unbalanced,	unfair,	and	unclear.	Where	the	literal	interpretation	of	
postmodernism	henceforth	claims	“apprehension”	within	the	untruth	(or	silent	aspect)	of	conceptual	
culture,	the	democratic	practice	declares	the	reality	of	this	apprehension	by	providing	an	equitable,	yet	
volatile	and	deterministic	system;	the	grim	reaper	or	guardian	of	truth,	according	to	position.		
Moreover,	if	democratic	voting	comes	down	to	a	decision	between	democrats	or	republicans,	
liberals	or	conservatives,	left	or	right,	then	the	intellect	may	weigh	their	concept	of	truth	between	
definitive	options.	As	such,	Scott	Welsh	supposes	that	“democracy	might	be	seen	as	the	power	of	the	
people—every	single	one	of	them—to	compete	for	the	power	to	find	or	produce	a	habitable	space	in	
which	they	can	protect	and	build	upon	what	is	important	to	them;”	in	this	case,	truth	(160).	When	we	
are	presented	with	clear	options,	therefore,	we	are	given	the	impression	that	we	must	compress	our	
truth	to	fit	the	bill	and	hope	to	chose	wisely	as	Watts	jests,	“the	more	people	who	agree	with	us,	the	less	
nagging	insecurity	about	our	position”	(10).	Several	other	scholars	similarly	underscore	the	importance	
of	persuasion,	or	rhetoric	in	democracy	(Allen;	Farrell;	Hariman;	Lippmann).		
With	democracy,	in	short,	the	debate	between	truth	and	untruth	becomes	an	institutional	
practice,	where	choosing	truth	and	conquering	untruth	is	personified	in	terms	of	the	majority.	In	this	
fashion,	Welsh	explains	how	the	language	we	use	to	talk	about	democracy	determines	our	cultural	
fidelity	to	the	system,	as	well	as	its	efficacy	in	rhetorical	terms:			
Rhetoric	is	the	production	of	texts	that	win	support	by	receiving	a	range	of	appropriations	wide	
enough	to	constitute	a	voting	majority.	It	creates	the	democratically	essential	appearance	of	
coherence	out	of	incoherence	that	connects	institutional	authority	to	cultural	authority—the	
lived	experience	of	democratic	legitimacy	(161).		
With	this	quote,	Welsh	explains	us	how	democracy,	like	language,	is	more	so	a	matter	of	persuasion	
than	preference	or	representation.	Democracy	as	it	relates	to	postmodernism,	is,	therefore,	a	device	
that	justifies	our	need	to	conquer	the	truth	of	others	with	power,	rather	than	the	possessor	of	the	truth,	
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because	the	way	we	talk	about	it	does	nothing	for	the	exploration	of	truth	itself.	Nonetheless,	we	trust	
the	operation	(as	we	trust	language)	because	we	are	not	motivated	to	account	for	the	relationship	
between	sides.	Thus,	we	interact	with	democracy	not	only	as	if	it	provides	truth,	but	more	so	as	if	
winning	is	the	only	way	to	obtain	the	truth	(in	societal	terms),	as	the	evidence	of	this	assumption	follows	
in	two	parts.		
	First,	when	the	results	of	a	democratic	vote	are	final,	the	“truth”	aspect	of	the	opposition	is	
temporarily	simulated	for	those	who	voted	with	the	majority	as	well	as	for	those	who	did	not,	in	theory.	
Those	who	voted	with	are	satisfied	that	their	truth	has	been	confirmed	by	the	public,	and	in	this	way	
they	are	encouraged	to	maintain	both	the	practice	and	their	position	in	the	next	time	around.	
Conversely,	those	who	did	not	vote	with	the	majority	may	suffer	from	cultural	outcasting	as	the	
minority,	and	in	frustration	they	become	increasingly	consumed	with	revenge,	thus	all	the	more	
subordinate	to	the	system.	Moreover,	if	an	individual	chooses	neither	side	they	will	remain	as	an	outlier;	
uneffective	to	the	process	and	irrelevant	to	the	outcome.	In	any	case,	our	culture	utilizes	the	democratic	
vote	as	a	way	to	determine	“truth”	by	persuading	the	majority	to	one	side	or	the	other,	which	flatters	
the	intellect’s	sense	of	balance	until	the	next	round.		
Second,	as	democratic	elections	are	repeated	every	so	often,	their	relevance	is	maintained	
through	individuals	not	only	by	the	thrill	of	the	outcome,	but	more	so	by	the	fact	that	winning	requires	
hard	work	and	creativity.	In	order	to	win,	therefore,	we	must	invest	our	attention,	time,	and	artistry	to	
the	cause;	the	more	we	invest,	the	higher	the	stakes,	the	more	convinced	we	must	be	about	our	
position.	The	intellect,	now	committed	to	a	position,	will	avert	the	common	ground	at	all	costs,	if	not	
out	of	contempt,	then	to	avoid	commonality,	therefore,	confusion.	When	the	votes	are	counted,	the	
most	persuasive	and	powerful	players	will	win,	and,	having	gave	it	their	best	shot,	the	underdogs	kick	
the	dust	the	and	train	their	tricks	until	the	next	round.	In	either	case,	both	parties	contribute	to	the	
system	and	look	forward	to	competing	again	with	new	rules	and	new	players.	Given	that	the	situation	
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appears	to	be	a	tragically	repetitive	cycle,	Watts	cleverly	suggests	that	democracy	could	be	thought	of	as	
“a	fight	haunted	by	chronic	frustration,”	and	we	will	never	discover	truth	in	this	manner,	“because	we	
are	doing	something	as	crazy	as	trying	to	keep	the	mountains	and	get	rid	of	the	valleys”	(35).					
Despite	the	contradiction,	this	opposition	is	so	much	the	way	of	Western	culture	that	the	
democratic	concept	is	historically	generated	within	the	minds	of	millions,	which	“finally	appears	on	the	
same	occasion	every	time,”	and	thus	acquires	“at	last	the	same	meaning	for	men	it	would	have	if	it	were	
the	sole	necessary	image”	(Nietzsche,	8).	Following	Nietzsche,	the	paradox	between	components	
becomes	clear	as	the	anticipation	of	a	nearing	election	leads	people	to	think	that	either	the	truth	has	
since	been	compromised	and	so	must	be	redefined,	or	that	the	truth	is	at	odds	and	so	must	be	
defended.	In	either	case,	the	untruth	eventually	returns,	and	so	truth	remains	as	a	debate	that	may	only	
be	publicly	settled	through	democracy.	Nevertheless,	when	the	untruth	returns,	we	act	as	if	“the	
generated	image	were	a	strictly	causal	one,”	and	blame	it	all	on	the	system	(Nietzsche,	8).	Over	time,	
democracy,	rather	than	a	metaphor	for	a	method	to	determine	who	has	the	power	(and	totally	
unrelated	to	truth	beyond	power),	becomes	personified	in	culture	as	a	legitimate	matter	of	truth	all	by	
its	powerful	self,	and	the	burden	of	truth	is	lifted	from	the	individual.	As	such,	Nietzsche	declares	that	to	
wonder	which	side	is	the	correct	or	more	honorable	“is	quite	meaningless,	for	this	would	have	to	have	
been	decided	previously	in	accordance	with	the	criterion	of	the	correct	perception,	which	means,	in	
accordance	with	a	criterion	which	is	not	available”	(7).	As	any	individual	may	freely	see	through	the	
surface	of	democracy	and	understand	that	this	truth-seeking	method	is	simply	redundant,	the	system,	
as	a	“thing,”	still	maintains	the	cultural	notion	that	all	matters	of	untruth	will	be	objectified	and	settled	
by	democratic	majority	thereafter.	In	motion,	and	to	scale,	we	seem	to	have	forgotten	that	Uncle	Sam	
demands	personal	emancipation	in	the	conquest	of	others	“is	nevertheless	merely	the	residue	of	a	
metaphor”	(Nietzsche,	6).		
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Moving	forward,	if	we	are	to	reach	homeostasis	with	truth	we	must	extract	the	metaphor.	
Perhaps	the	first	step	of	extraction	should	be	prefaced	by	Watts	as	he	reminds	us	that	when	it	comes	to	
truth,	“there	really	is	nothing	to	clutch	and	no	one	to	clutch	it.	This	is	depressing	only	so	long	as	there	
remains	a	notion	that	there	might	be	some	way	of	fixing	it,	of	putting	it	off	just	once	more,”	as	such	is	
the	case	with	language,	democracy,	and	the	more	trivial	technologies	(39).	In	an	effort	to	break	this	
chain,	Watts––as	a	pioneer	of	universal	theory––thusly	introduces	the	quest	at	hand	by	interpreting	why	
we	ought	to	sincerely	consider	the	whole	in	natural	terms:		
Taking,	therefore,	a	longer	and	wider	view	of	things,	the	entire	project	of	“conquering	nature”	
appears	more	and	more	of	a	mirage—an	increase	in	the	pace	of	living	without	fundamental	
change	of	position,	as	the	Red	Queen	suggested.	But	technical	progress	becomes	a	way	of	
stalling	faster	and	faster	because	of	the	basic	illusion	that	man	and	nature,	the	organism	and	the	
environment,	the	controller	and	the	controlled	are	quite	different	things.	We	might	“conquer”	
nature	if	we	could	first,	or	at	the	same	time,	conquer	our	own	nature,	though	we	do	not	see	
that	human	nature	and	“outside”	nature	are	all	of	a	piece.	In	the	same	way,	we	do	not	see	that	
"I”	as	the	knower	and	controller	am	the	same	fellow	as	“myself”	as	something	to	be	known	and	
controlled	(Watts,	50–51).		
As	Watts	suggests,	we	must	address	the	taboo	point	blank;	that	nothing	lies	beneath	the	surface	of	
language.	For	opposites	are,	beyond	a	shadow	of	a	doubt,	very	much	dependent	on	each	other,	and	
thus	to	think	of	democracy	the	producer	of	truth	may	only	appear	logical	“upon	ignoring,	or	screening	
out	of	consciousness,	the	interdependence	between	two	sides”	(Watts,	41).	And	with	this	idea	we	may	
begin	to	uncover	exactly	how	the	metaphor	lead	us	astray.		
Truth:	My	Country,	Right	or	Wrong	
The	purpose	of	this	final	section	is	to	reorient	the	intellect	to	language,	technology,	
postmodernism,	and	democracy	to	the	way	they	work	through	metaphor.	As	we	have	seen	how	
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language	fosters	opposition	and	the	ways	in	which	it	affects	our	culture,	we	may	now	consider	more	
seriously	how	it	is	that	preferring	one	side	over	the	other	is	what	Nietzsche	claims	to	be	“so	much	the	
rule	and	the	law	among	men	that	there	is	almost	nothing	which	is	less	comprehensible	than	how	an	
honest	and	pure	drive	for	truth	could	have	arisen	among	them”	(2).	In	narrowing	the	critique	to	those	
oblivious	to	metaphor,	however,	as	“man	has	an	invincible	inclination	to	allow	himself	to	be	deceived,”	
we	reach	the	malfunction	at	once	(Nietzsche,	2).	For	to	think,	speak,	act,	understand	and	experience	is	
to	use	metaphor,	and	to	systematically	comprehend	part	of	a	concept	in	terms	of	another.	And	although	
our	conceptual	system	allows	us	to	find	similarities	between	concepts,	it	likewise	hides	other	portions	of	
the	concept	and,	therefore,	the	orientation	of	the	single	concept	in	relation	to	our	system	of	concepts	
(Lakoff	and	Johnson).	In	this	fashion,	Watts	argues	that	we	are	influenced	“to	regard	some	bits	of	
perception,	or	some	features	of	the	world,	as	more	noteworthy,	more	significant,	than	others.	To	these	
we	attend,	and	the	rest	we	ignore—for	which	reason	conscious	attention	is	at	the	same	time	ignore-
ance	(i.e.,	ignorance)”	(32).	In	response,	Lakoff	and	Johnson	demonstrate	the	catch	of	metaphor:		
For	example,	in	the	midst	of	a	heated	argument,	when	we	are	intent	on	attacking	our	
opponent's	position	and	defending	our	own,	we	may	lose	sight	of	the	cooperative	aspects	of	
arguing.	Someone	who	is	arguing	with	you	can	be	viewed	as	giving	you	his	time,	a	valuable	
commodity,	in	an	effort	at	mutual	understanding.	But	when	we	are	preoccupied	with	the	battle	
aspects,	we	often	lose	sight	of	the	cooperative	aspects	(10).		
Further	justifying	the	previous	claims,	Nietzsche	clarifies	how	the	catch	is	just	as	necessary	as	it	is	
(literally)	destructive	by	articulating	how	we	may	not	understand	the	message	without	shutting	out	
irrelevant	concepts,	and	within	the	narrowed	attention	we	lose	the	influence	of	universality;	the	most	
relevant	concept	of	all:	
Everything	marvelous	about	the	laws	of	nature,	everything	that	quite	astonishes	us	therein	and	
seems	to	demand	explanation,	everything	that	might	lead	us	to	distrust	idealism:	all	this	is	
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completely	and	solely	contained	within	the	mathematical	strictness	and	inviolability	of	our	
representations	of	time	and	space.	But	we	produce	these	representations	in	and	from	ourselves	
with	the	same	necessity	with	which	the	spider	spins.	If	we	are	forced	to	comprehend	all	things	
only	under	these	forms,	then	it	ceases	to	be	amazing	that	in	all	things	we	actually	comprehend	
nothing	but	these	forms	(8).		
In	short,	when	we	“lose	sight	of	the	cooperative	aspects”	between	things,	we	mistake	the	things	to	be	
independent	instances	of	their	own	universe,	as	such	is	the	trouble	with	the	fragmentation	of	culture	
(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	10).	But	this	is	not	the	way	things	are,	and	as	we	have	seen	in	previous	sections	the	
effect	of	this	mistake	is	anything	but	arbitrary.	Thus,	in	order	to	reclaim	our	senses,	and	the	truth	(at	
last),	Watts	proposes	that,	“the	‘single	glance’	of	our	spotlight,	narrowed	attention,	which	has	been	
taught	to	confuse	its	glimpses	with	seperate	‘things,’	must	somehow	be	opened	to	the	full	vision”	(107).	
In	being	open	to	the	full	vision,	the	metaphor	may	never	be	mistaken	for	truth	nor	separated	from	the	
environment	that	supports	it.	But	without	the	possibility	for	the	essence	of	things––and	so	too	the	
interconnectedness	of	everything––to	“appear,”	opening	the	vision	is	certainly	not	easy	for	those	who	
must	see	to	believe,	as	the	evidence	of	this	assumption	follows	in	two	parts.		
First,	the	problem	is	not	that	opposites	are	merely	two	ends	of	a	spectrum	that	express	
variations	of	the	same	thing,	the	problem	is	that	we	do	not	have	ordinary,	intermediary	language	to	
express	how	opposites	could	possibly	be	variations	of	the	same	thing.	For	example,	where	opposites	
find	themselves	in	hard	terms	like	“happiness”	or	“sadness,”	we	express	the	intermediary	between	the	
two	with	more	conceptual	terms	like	“ambivalence,”	“dispassion,”	or	“detachment.”	These	terms	may	
satisfy	the	expression	of	being	neither	happy	nor	sad,	and	thus	resemble	a	sort	of	truth,	but	more	so	
they	“remain	nebulous	ideas	without	becoming	vivid	feelings	or	experiences,”	and	for	this	uncertain	
reason	we	do	not	naturally	relate	“ambivalence,”	“dispassion,”	nor	“detachment”	to	the	certain	feeling	
of	“happiness,”	nor	“sadness”	(Watts,	34).	Moreover,	because	“happiness”	and	“sadness”	are	so	well	
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integrated	in	our	culture	that	it	is	inconvenient	to	express	the	emotions	by	any	other	term,	we	also	
almost	always	measure	one	in	contrast	to	the	other;	and	in	this	way	we	think	of	“happiness”	as	
fundamentally	antagonistic	to	“sadness”	(even	though	the	leading	synonym	would	be	“unhappiness”).		
As	sadness	is	taken	out	of	the	context	of	happiness,	and	happiness	out	of	the	context	of	
sadness,	we	are	left	with	two	entirely	separate	feelings;	one	of	which	is	bad,	and	so	the	other	of	which	
must	be	good.	From	there	we	develop	the	“correct	perception”	by	conceptualizing	the	terms—“which,”	
Nietzsche	reminds	us,	“would	mean	‘the	adequate	expression	of	an	object	in	the	subject’”—without	
noticing	that	an	“adequate	expression”	would	be	impossible	without	accounting	for	the	underlying	unity	
between	opposites;	at	which	point,	“happiness”	becomes	a	matter	of	“sadness”	and	vice	versa	(7).	And	
so	to	favor	one	is	to	reject	the	whole,	as	Nietzsche	suggests,	which	is	surely	just	as	much	a	shame	for	the	
sake	of	happiness	as	it	is	for	sadness.	Furthermore,	when	we	are	ambivalent,	dispassioned,	or	detached,	
we	do	not	justify	the	feeling	in	plain	language	like	“neither	happy	nor	sad,”	and	in	so	feeling	we	confuse	
the	experience	to	be	something	more	similar	to	“doubt,”	“apprehension,”	or	“anxiety,”	as	such	is	the	
tone	of	all	sensed-but-not-experienced	intuition.	With	the	intellect	oriented	to	the	whole	in	this	way,	
our	ambivalence,	dispassion,	and	detachment	will	always	remain	as	skepticism	on	the	public	scale.	And	
without	reason	to	see	that	“all	so-called	things	and	events	‘going	together,’	like	the	head	and	tail	of	the	
cat,”	we	resolve	our	uncertainty	by	sticking	to	either	pole	(Watts,	35).		
Second,	as	we	locate	the	problem	between	opposites	we	are	ever	frustrated	by	obligatorily	
oppositional	terms.	Watts	explains	that	the	trouble	“is	not	only	that	language	is	dualistic,	insofar	as	
words	are	labels	for	mutually	exclusive	classes,”	the	trouble	is	that	the	words	are	“so	central	and	so	
basic	to	my	existence,”	that	the	intellect	may	never	realize	how	we	handle	them	as	objects	rather	than	
tools	(Watts,	152).	For	example,	the	meanings	of	“happiness”	and	“sadness”	are	so	regular	that	they	
may	be	considered	to	“have	an	existence	independent	of	people	and	contexts”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	11).	
This	is	true	of	all	terms	that	can	be	spontaneously	used	and	yet	ensured	that	“all	the	participants	in	the	
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conversation	understand	the	sentences	in	the	same	way”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	12).	For,	in	addition	to	
oppositional	terms	like	“happiness”	and	“sadness”	(or	“life”	and	“death;”	“black”	and	“white”),	consider	
how	common	nouns	like	“music,”	“game,”	or	“road”	also	provide	common	understanding	by	conjuring	a	
“thing”	that	may	be	transposed	without	atrophy.	Lakoff	and	Johnson	explain	that	in	these	cases	“it	is	far	
more	difficult	to	see	that	there	is	anything	hidden	by	the	metaphor	or	even	to	see	that	there	is	a	
metaphor	here	at	all,”	because	such	objectivity	is	“so	much	the	conventional	way	of	thinking	about	
language	that	it	is	sometimes	hard	to	imagine	that	it	might	not	fit	reality”	(11).	
Contrariwise,	terms	like	“ambivalence,”	“dispassion,”	and	“detachment”	are	much	harder	to	
objectify	because	they	depend	on	their	context	in	order	to	carry	meaning	between	citizens,	as	the	
“words	are	too	slow	and	too	clumsy	for	describing	such	things,	and	conscious	attention	is	too	narrow	for	
keeping	track	of	all	their	details”	(Watts,	156).	Given	that	these	concepts	are	already	commonly	
misunderstood	beneath	opposites,	we	may	not	credibly	communicate	with	each	other	without	relying	
heavily	on	the	provided	context.	But,	given	that	each	individual	has	built	their	own	conceptual	system	to	
orient	such	terms	to	said	context,	and	the	said	context	has	been	decontextualized	from	the	whole,	we	
see	how	the	“very	systematicity	that	allows	us	to	comprehend	one	aspect	of	a	concept	in	terms	of	
another”	will	“keep	us	from	focusing	on	other	aspects	of	the	concept	that	are	inconsistent	with	that	
metaphor”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	10).	In	this	way,	even	those	who	consciously	reject	the	mainstream	and	
turn	inwards	for	truth	will	preserve	the	mainstream	values,	whereas	the	meanings	of	“ambivalence,”	
"dispassion,”	and	“detachment”	may	be	refined	between	opposites	from	person	to	person,	but	the	
concept	is	still	conceptually	separated	from	“happiness”	and	“sadness;”	and	in	that	respect	their	use	will	
always	be	“coherent	with	the	major	orientational	metaphors	of	the	mainstream	culture”	(Lakoff	and	
Johnson,	25).	
As	we	have	identified	the	obstruction	of	meaning	between	the	opposites	of	language,	as	well	as	
the	formation	of	meaning	through	metaphor,	we	may	now	contend	that	truth	is	a	matter	of	perception	
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and,	therefore,	an	ultimately	unified	and	meaningful	public	aspiration,	as	the	evidence	of	this	
assumption	follows.	(1)	If	what	we	consider	to	be	true	is	really	the	manifestation	of	a	metaphor	as	a	
“thing,”	then	this	truth,	Nietzsche	pleas,	“is	a	thoroughly	anthropomorphic	truth	which	contains	not	a	
single	point	which	would	be	‘true	in	itself’	or	really	and	universally	valid	apart	from	man”	(6).	(2)	As	the	
intellect	is	driven	by	truth	in	spite	of	untruth,	which	must	be	all	that	is	left	unnamed,	then	what	“the	
investigator	of	such	truths	is	seeking	is	only	the	metamorphosis	of	the	world	into	man,”	and	in	doing	so	
the	intellect	may	only	assimilate	with	the	conventions	of	culture,	as	such	is	the	case	of	the	postmodern	
condition	(Nietzsche,	7).	(3)	The	individual,	therefore,	operates	in	search	of	truth	in	the	same	manner	as	
the	public,	whereas	our	priorities	and	definitions	may	vary,	but	are	altogether	“coherent	with	the	major	
orientational	metaphors	of	the	mainstream	culture”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	25).	In	this	way,	when	it	
comes	to	perception,	one	point	of	view	can	fit	all.		
Basically,	yet	radically,	in	same	way	that	conceptual	metaphors	systemize	our	universe	and,	
therefore,	represent	the	universe	in	whole,	individuals,	as	the	creators	of	metaphor,	are	likewise	a	
matter	of	metaphor	and,	therefore,	represent	the	universe	(both	within	and	without)	themselves.	As	we	
reach	this	pinnacle	point,	Watts	explains	that	“every	individual	is	an	expression	of	the	whole	realm	of	
nature,	a	unique	action	of	the	total	universe,”	and	in	the	same	way	that	we	are	not	motivated	to	
understand	metaphors	as	they	are,	this	fact	“is	rarely,	if	ever,	experienced	by	most	individuals”	(9).	
Moreover,	“even	those	who	know	it	to	be	true	in	theory	do	not	sense	or	feel	it”	because	they	must	still	
use	metaphor	in	consistence	with	culture––where	they,	too,	must	take	themselves	for	objects––and	
“continue	to	be	aware	of	themselves	as	isolated	‘egos’	inside	bags	of	skin”	(Watts,	9).	Hence,	the	body	
of	the	individual	is	a	metaphor	for	metaphor	(or	a	meta-metaphor),	the	object	of	the	universe	that	
operates	in	the	same	motion	as	the	solar	system.	And	just	like	metaphor,	language,	technology,	
postmodernism,	and	democracy,	the	body	can	be	“considered	as	a	wall,	barrier,	or	boundary	which	
definitively	separates	oneself	from	the	world—despite	the	fact	that	it	is	covered	with	pores	breathing	air	
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and	with	nerve-ends	relaying	information”	(Watts,	56).	In	addition,	the	body,	thus	the	metaphor,	
“informs	us	just	as	much	as	it	outforms;	it	is	as	much	a	bridge	as	a	barrier”	(Watts,	56).	Where	to	sum,	
Watts	completes	this	thought	with	a	most	appropriate	illustration:		
“Individual”	is	the	Latin	form	of	the	Greek	“atom”—that	which	cannot	be	cut	or	divided	any	
further	into	separate	parts.	We	cannot	chop	off	a	person's	head	or	remove	his	heart	without	
killing	him.	But	we	can	kill	him	just	as	effectively	by	separating	him	from	his	proper	
environment.	This	implies	that	the	only	true	atom	is	the	universe—that	total	system	of	
interdependent	“thing-events”	which	can	be	separated	from	each	other	only	in	name.	For	the	
human	individual	is	not	built	as	a	car	is	built.	He	does	not	come	into	being	by	assembling	parts,	
by	screwing	a	head	on	to	a	neck,	by	wiring	a	brain	to	a	set	of	lungs,	or	by	welding	veins	to	a	
heart.	Head,	neck,	heart,	lungs,	brain,	veins,	muscles,	and	glands	are	separate	names	but	not	
separate	events,	and	these	events	grow	into	being	simultaneously	and	interdependently.	In	
precisely	the	same	way,	the	individual	is	separate	from	his	universal	environment	only	in	name.	
When	this	is	not	recognized,	you	have	been	fooled	by	your	name.	Confusing	names	with	nature,	
you	come	to	believe	that	having	a	separate	name	makes	you	a	separate	being.	This	is—rather	
literally—to	be	spellbound	(69–70).	
	 But,	as	the	previous	sections	have	expressed	the	quiet	ways	in	which	we	are	prone	to	spells,	the	
intellect	has	a	very	hard	time	realizing	this	ultimate	truth;	and	so	we	resort	to	untruth	by	our	own	
definition	without	understanding	“that	our	most	private	thoughts	and	emotions	are	not	actually	our	
own.	For	we	think	in	terms	of	languages	and	images	which	we	did	not	invent,	but	which	were	given	to	us	
by	our	society”	(Watts,	70).	At	last,	if	the	intellect	could	give	up	this	sensation	Nietzsche	supposes	that	
our	“self-consciousness”––our	doubt,	apprehension,	and	anxiety––would	evaporate,	for	between	
opposites	“there	is	no	causality,	no	correctness,	and	no	expression;	there	is,	at	most,	an	aesthetic	
relation;”	a	metaphor,	“for	which	I	there	is	required,	in	any	case,	a	freely	inventive	intermediate	sphere	
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and	mediating	force”	(7).	Thus,	what	lies	between	opposites	cannot	be	expressed	in	form	because	the	
mediator	is	you,	the	individual	(and	not	the	body),	the	public	(and	not	the	opposition),	the	“being”	(and	
not	the	“thing”),	the	universe	(and	not	the	matter).		
At	last,	as	we	near	the	end	of	my	statement,	the	answer	to	our	initial	question—what	makes	us	
think	we	are	so	special?—should	be	that	after	all	of	this	scientific	discovery	and	time	spent	digging	
deeper	into	the	compartments	of	rationality,	our	era	is	more	disoriented	to	truth	than	any	other	and,	
consequently,	more	preoccupied	by	the	object	of	truth	than	any	other.	Following	suit,	my	first	thesis	
question—as	we	assume	the	truth	in	language	by	the	disguise	of	metaphor,	could	the	postmodern	
condition	be	more	so	a	symptom	of	language	than	a	matter	of	truth?—is	confirmed	on	my	account,	
because	the	postmodern	condition	itself	is	a	metaphor.	Though	it	would	also	be	fair	to	neither	confirm	
nor	deny,	because	as	long	as	language	is	perceived	literally	it	is	also	experienced	literally.	In	this	way,	we	
created	the	postmodern	condition	just	as	much	as	we	live	the	postmodern	condition,	as	“the	most	
fundamental	values	in	a	culture	will	be	coherent	with	the	metaphorical	structure	of	the	most	
fundamental	concepts	in	the	culture”	(Lakoff	and	Johnson,	24).	In	either	case,	the	widespread	
apprehension	known	as	the	postmodern	condition	is	logical,	for	the	behavior	of	language	itself	is	
apprehensive!	 	
	Thus,	the	answer	to	my	second	question—how	does	democracy	affect	our	diagnosis?—is	to	be	
that	democracy	personifies	the	opposition	of	language	and	the	apprehension	of	culture	in	the	form	of	
popular	vote.	In	consideration	of	what	we	learned	about	opposites	as	they	relate	to	the	whole,	
however,	we	may	now	reestablish	the	value	of	democracy	as	a	matter	of	equitable	self-interest,	because	
“all	winners	need	losers;	all	saints	need	sinners;	all	sages	need	fools”	(Watts,	118;	Allen;	Welsh).	For	the	
outcome	of	a	democratic	vote	depends	on	how	you	look	at	it,	and	in	each	instance	the	“cause”	of	
winning	and	losing	depends	on	circumstances	of	the	whole;	and	so,	with	democracy,	language,	and	all	
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other	technologies,	“it	would	be	best	to	drop	the	idea	of	causality	and	use	instead	the	idea	of	relativity”	
(Watts,	95).		
In	conclusion,	with	a	lesson	in	pragmatic	relativity,	when	the	essence	of	an	element	remains	no	
matter	how	many	components	are	added,	the	essence	of	the	element	must	apply	to	all	components.	
Thus,	“any	galaxy,	any	star,	any	planet,	or	any	observer	can	be	taken	as	the	central	point	of	reference,	so	
that	everything	is	central	in	relation	to	everything	else!”	(Watts,	29).	All	things	considered,	when	we	see	
through	the	illusion	of	metaphor	as	an	illusion	and	nothing	more,	we	understand	that	nothing	may	be	
valued	without	its	relationship	to	every	other	thing;	and	likewise,	when	we	see	through	the	illusion	of	
the	individual,	we	may	begin	to	understand	that	the	ego	cannot	be	valued	without	its	relationship	to	
every	other	ego.	Penultimately,	when	the	relativity	of	metaphor	is	understood,	it	becomes	“impossible	
to	think	of	oneself	as	better	than,	or	superior	to,	others	for	having	done	so”	(Watts,	21).	Ergo,	the	
conflict	of	matters,	both	public	and	private,	is	to	“be	understood,	or	explained,	in	terms	of	situations	just	
as	words	must	be	understood	in	the	context	of	sentences,	paragraphs,	chapters,	books,	libraries,	and…	
life	itself,”	to	be	sure;	“not	only	because	every	situation	is	infinitely	complex,	but	also	because	the	total	
situation	is	the	universe”	(Watts,	97).	In	conclusion,	when	the	going	gets	tough,	we	may	point	fingers	
wheresoever	and	save	ourselves	the	burden	of	guilt	for	all	humanity,	but	when	the	tough	gets	going,	we	
notice	that	our	fingers	are	definitely	connected	to	our	bodies	and	are,	therefore,	emphatically	relevant	
to	any	way	in	which	they	point.			
Conclusion:	The	More	Things	Change,	the	More	They	Stay	the	Same		
So,	the	intellect	is	driven	towards	truth	insofar	as	there	is	untruth	to	be	proven	otherwise.	Given	
the	nature	of	language,	there	will	always	untruth	to	be	proven	otherwise	insofar	as	the	intellect	does	
not	take	care	to	notice	the	metaphor.	Thus,	the	individual	that	remembers	the	nature	of	language	is	
especially	free	from	such	trivialities,	and	with	this	freedom	can	produce	the	most	creative	and	
groundless	works	of	art;	the	product	of	genuine	truth,	but	not	the	truth	itself.	At	a	time	in	social	history	
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where	the	regular	is	enforced	to	replace	the	irregular,	albeit	for	higher	pay,	we	must	be	cautious	that	
our	tendency	to	replace	the	truth	with	things	that	represent	the	truth	also	purges	the	magic	from	our	
individual	experience;	the	wide-eyed	wonder	that	maintains	an	intoxicating	gamble	against	the	ever-
changing	odds,	as	such	is	the	case	with	truth	and	the	meaning	of	life	itself.	But,	all	things	being	equal,	
we	must	not	assume	a	total	victory	over	the	will	of	untruth;	not	now	and	not	ever.	For	even	if	the	truth	
is	understood,	we	must	abandon	it	from-time-to-time	in	order	to	meet	the	superficial	requirements	of	
our	daily	lives;	if	not	to	live	with	the	herd,	then	to	merely	continue	living	at	all.	But,	as	things	come	and	
go,	the	truth	will	likewise	resurface	when	we	notice	that	“change	is	in	some	sense	an	illusion,	for	we	are	
always	at	the	point	where	any	future	can	take	us!”	(Watts,	47).	
Thus,	the	central	meaning	of	this	thesis	may	be	even	more	general	than	the	superficiality	of	
language	and	culture,	as	it	comes	down	to	the	explicit	truth––insofar	as	the	truth	may	be	explicit––for	
the	reality	of	this	conclusion	follows	in	two	parts.	(1)	We	will	never	“arrive”	at	truth.	No	matter	how	
many	times	we	divide	the	universe	into	comprehensive	parts,	no	matter	how	many	things	we	know	as	a	
“matter	of	fact,”	the	proof	will	never	compare	to	what	we	can	perceive	with	our	own	intuition.	
Moreover,	the	more	things	we	define	as	a	matter	of	fact,	the	more	bothered	we	are	by	those	things	left	
undefined;	as	Watts	puts	it	simply,	“when	the	outcome	of	a	game	is	certain,	we	call	it	quits	and	begin	
another”	(45).	As	such,	we	may	never	be	totally	satisfied	by	anything	we	discover.	(2)	Just	as	we	can	
neither	obtain	nor	control	the	truth,	we	cannot	do	away	with	our	passion	for	truth.	We	may	lose	sense	
of	it,	to	be	sure,	but,	with	Watts’	relative	terms,	if	“every	this	goes	with	every	that,”	then	“without	
others	there	is	no	self,	and	without	somewhere	else	there	is	no	here,	so	that—in	this	sense—self	is	
other	and	here	is	there”	(124).	In	essence,	the	truth	is	just	as	much	the	untruth	as	the	untruth	is	the	
truth,	for	the	truth	is	human,	as	Nietzsche	declares,	“and	only	its	possessor	and	begetter	takes	it	so	
solemnly—as	though	the	world’s	axis	turned	within	it”	(1).	As	we	move	forward,	we	do	so	without	fear	
of	the	taboo,	without	distaste	for	the	other,	and	without	repeating	our	humble	mistakes,	for	though	we	
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suffer	more	deeply	and	more	often	when	compassioned,	we	expose	the	fundamental	antagonist	and	
flourish	indefinitely	for	having	done	so.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Dedicated	to	my	mom	and	dad,	and	the	beings	between	opposites	thereafter.	
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